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I. Introduction 
Negative average common stock price reactions 
to conversion-forcing calls of convertible bonds 
and preferred stocks are well documented (see 
Mikkelson 1981 and Mais, Moore, and Rogers 
1989 for evidence on calls of convertible bonds 
and preferred stocks, respectively). Possible ex- 
planations for the adverse price reactions are nu- 
merous, but negative information is one of the 
most prominent (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1985). 
Mazzeo and Moore (1992), however, present evi- 
dence of price recovery immediately following 
call announcements, thus casting doubt on nega- 
tive information as the exclusive cause. 
In this study, we confirm and extend the find- 
ing by Mazzeo and Moore (1992) that the an- 
nouncement effect is transitory, and we employ 
an information measure to investigate whether 
the announcement effect is driven by negative 
information. We show that, on average, prices 
recover more than 100% of the loss in value suf- 
fered at announcement by the end of the conver- 
sion period. Although adverse changes in profit- 
ability are not the only possible reason for 
Negative stock price 
reactions to conver- 
sion-forcing calls of 
convertible bonds and 
preferred stocks are re- 
examined, and most of 
the sample firms are 
shown to exhibit full 
price recovery by the 
end of the conversion 
period. In addition, ana- 
lysts' earnings fore- 
casts, both short-term 
and long-term, are 
found to be revised up- 
ward following call an- 
nouncements for con- 
vertible bonds and 
preferred stocks. The 
combined findings cast 
doubt on the estab- 
lished belief that such 
capital structure deci- 
sions signal negative in- 
formation about firm 
value. 
* We express our appreciation to Steve Mann, Naval Mo- 
dani, Shawn Phelps, and Rod Roenfeldt for helpful com- 
ments, and to Ellen Roueche for expert technical assistance. 
The study has benefited greatly from numerous suggestions 
from an anonymous referee for the Journal and we are most 
grateful. 
(Journal of Business, 1996, vol. 69, no. 1) 
? 1996 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
0021-9398/96/6901-0004$0 1.50 
89 
90 Journal of Business 
negative wealth effects, they figure prominently in the information- 
signaling literature (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1985). Thus, the responses 
of securities analysts to these events merit examination in order to pin 
down the nature of the information effect. Contrary to predictions 
implied in information signaling models, we find that Value Line ana- 
lysts revise long-range and short-range earnings forecasts upward fol- 
lowing call announcements. 
In Section II we review the literature documenting and explaining 
negative call announcement effects. We then describe our sample and 
confirm that there are negative average call announcement effects for 
our convertible bonds (- 1.168%) and convertible preferred stocks 
(- 1.435%). Next we examine common stock prices before call an- 
nouncements and compare them with prices at the end of conversion 
to determine how much of the announcement effect is transitory. The 
results show that all of the announcement effect is transitory for most 
of the firms in the sample. In Section III, we show that, on average, 
the short-term and long-term Value Line forecasts are revised upward 
following calls. The findings are summarized in Section IV. 
II. Convertible Security Calls-Theory and Evidence 
A. The Evidence and Explanations 
Leverage-reducing decisions such as conversion-forcing calls of con- 
vertible securities may convey low confidence in future earnings (see 
Ross 1977; and Harris and Raviv 1985).1 Consistent with this explana- 
tion, conversion-forcing calls of convertible bonds are found by Mik- 
kelson (1981) to produce a significant negative average price effect 
(- 2.13%), and convertible preferred stock calls are reported by Mais, 
Moore, and Rogers (1989) to produce a significant negative average 
price reaction (- 1.60%).2 Consistent with the explanation based on 
impending earnings deterioration, Ofer and Natarajan (1987) report an 
average earnings decline subsequent to convertible bond calls based 
on a simple extrapolative model of earnings expectations. 
Mazzeo and Moore (1992) show that at least some of the negative 
announcement effect is transitory, consistent with a short-term liquid- 
1. Constantinides and Grundy (1987) and Asquith and Mullins (1991) refine the Harris 
and Raviv (1985) argument to include the relative cash outflows (dividends and coupon 
payments) on the common stock and the convertibles as conditioning variables. Singh, 
Cowan, and Nayar (1991) refine the argument to include as a conditioning variable the 
decision to engage an underwriter. 
2. Subsequent studies corroborate the negative wealth effects of both types of con- 
vertible calls. Ofer and Natarajan (1987), Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991), 
Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991), Mazzeo and Moore (1992), and Byrd and Moore (1994) 
find significant negative average effects for convertible bond calls. Cowan, Nayar, and 
Singh (1992), Mazzeo and Moore (1992), and Byrd and Moore (1994) report significant 
average price reductions due to convertible preferred calls. 
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ity effect, and the finding holds for calls of convertible bonds and 
convertible preferred stocks. They suggest that the negative price reac- 
tion is a temporary price reduction caused by selling pressure rather 
than negative information. Specifically, securities dealers respond to 
call announcements by lowering quoted bid and asked prices in an 
attempt to balance buy and sell orders as investors convert and sell 
their new shares. Also, Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991), 
after correcting for an inherent bias in preannouncement earnings 
growth rates examined in Ofer and Natarajan (1987), show that earn- 
ings growth rates do not decline after calls. While the presence of a 
transitory component in the announcement return does not exclude a 
long-term information effect, it does raise the intriguing possibility that 
the information effect is not the dominant force. In addition, Asquith 
(1995) shows that almost all "in-the-money" convertible bonds in his 
sample are called quickly, which argues against an information- 
signaling explanation. 
B. Sample Selection 
Our sample of convertible bond call announcements for 1975-90 is iden- 
tified in Standard & Poor's Bond Guide; convertible preferred calls 
are determined for the same period from Moody's Dividend Record. 
We require that all sample calls have announcements published in the 
Wall Street Journal and that no other news stories pertaining to the 
calling firm appear in the Wall Street Journal within 2 days before or 
after the announcement date. We further require that all calls in the 
final sample be announced while in-the-money, that is, conversion 
value exceeds call price. Finally, all calls in the final sample have 
common stock returns recorded in the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) daily return files (including NASDAQ). Eliminating 
calls that fail to meet these criteria resulted in samples of 148 convert- 
ible bond calls and 52 convertible preferred calls. 
Next we require that sample firms have earnings forecasts supplied 
by Value Line. Short-term (current year) forecasts were found for 90 
of the 148 firms calling convertible bonds and 36 of the 52 firms calling 
convertible preferreds. Long-term forecasts (3-5 years ahead) were 
available for 69 of the firms calling bonds and 27 firms calling pre- 
ferreds.3 
Employing the market model and test statistics used by Mikkelson 
and Partch (1988), we confirm negative average announcement effects 
for our sample. The 2-day announcement period is the publication date 
and the trading day immediately before (t = -1, 0). For the sample 
of 90 in-the-money calls of convertible bonds, the average abnormal 
3. These screens, particularly the requirement of coverage by Value Line, may rule 
out analysis of smaller firms; thus, our findings may not generalize to the full population. 
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2-day announcement return is - 1.168%, significant at the .001 level 
(test-statistic [Z] = - 4.239). For the 36 preferred call announcements, 
the average abnormal return is - 1.435%, also significant at the .001 
level (Z = - 3.304). The results are nearly the same when abnormal 
returns are based on the mean-adjusted returns model estimated over 
the 120-day period following the end of the conversion period. Results 
of both return-generating models are nearly the same when parameters 
are estimated over the 120-day preevent period.4 
C. Price Recovery 
Given that our sample calls exhibit negative announcement effects, we 
now turn to the question of price recovery, namely, is the price decline 
permanent? The median number of calendar days in the conversion 
period (from the call announcement to the last day in which issues 
may be converted) is 31 for convertible bonds and 32 for convertible 
preferred stocks. A complete common stock price recovery over this 
period would support a short-term liquidity explanation and cast doubt 
on the validity of a negative information effect. The average price 
recovery can be examined by the ratio (PcEi/P-2-), where PcEi is the 
common stock price for the ith firm at the conversion expiration date, 
and P_2 is the common stock price for the ith firm 2 days before the 
call announcement is published in the financial press. If this ratio, on 
average, is greater than or equal to one, evidence is provided that 
common stock prices recover fully by the end of the conversion period. 
These tests include the firms in the sample that do not experience 
stock splits from 10 days before the announcement to the effective call 
date. Meeting these criteria are 33 of the 36 firms calling convertible 
preferred stocks and 75 of the 90 firms calling convertible bonds. Re- 
sults of the analysis of the ratios are reported in table 1. 
For the convertible bond sample, the mean ratio is 1.02834, signifi- 
cantly greater than 1.0 (t = 2.62) at the 5% level. The mean ratio 
for the preferred sample is 1.03743, also significantly greater than 1.0 
(t = 2.47) at the 5% level.5 These values indicate that the average 
announcement effect is erased by the end of the conversion period. In 
addition, of the 75 price ratios for convertible bond calls, 44 (59%) 
exceed one. The binomial probability, with equal probabilities for price 
ratios greater than or less than one, of drawing such a sample is .0827. 
Of the 33 convertible preferred calls, 23 (70%) of the price ratios ex- 
4. See Byrd and Moore (1994) for a discussion of preevent estimation versus post- 
event estimation in computing the stock price reaction to convertible call announce- 
ments. 
5. Normal theory confidence intervals for the 95% level lie above one. As a robustness 
check, we employ Efron's (1979) bootstrap using 1,000 iterations to establish a 95% 
confidence interval for the median price ratio. For convertible bond calls the interval 
for the median is [1.0070, 1.0196], and for convertible preferred calls it is [1.0000, 1.0159]. 
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TABLE 1 Stock Price Recovery Following Call Announcements for 75 
Convertible Bonds and 33 Convertible Preferred Stocks 
Price Ratio* 
Convertible bond calls (N = 75): 
Greater than 1/less than 1 44/31 t 
Mean 1.02834 
Test-statistic (t) 2.6214t 
Convertible preferred stock calls (N = 33): 
Greater than 1/less than 1 23/10? 
Mean 1.03743 
Test-statistic (t) 2.4724 
* The price ratio is the closing common stock price on the day conversion ends (PCE) divided by 
the closing price 2 days before call (P-2). 
t The probability of drawing 44 or more ratios greater than one is .0827 under the binomial 
distribution, with p = .5. 
t The null hypothesis is that the ratio is less than or equal to one. 
? The binomial probability of 23 or more of 33 ratios greater than one is .0175. 
ceed one. The binomial probability of drawing such a sample is .0175 
given equal probabilities. The findings are consistent with those of 
Mazzeo and Moore (1992) who report announcement period abnormal 
returns of - 1.2% and - 1.5% for calls of convertible bonds (N = 111) 
and convertible preferred stocks (N = 58), respectively, each followed 
by a 2.2% average cumulative abnormal return during the respective 
conversion periods. 
In figure 1, we give frequency histograms for the price ratios for the 
combined sample of 108 convertible calls (panel la), then convertible 
bond and preferred calls separately (panels lb and lc). The essence 
of the numerical values in table 1 is made even more apparent in figure 
la for the full sample. For reference, a normal density with mean 
1.0311 is superimposed on the figure. From inspection of figures lb 
(mean = 1.0283) and Ic (mean = 1.0374), it is clear that the bulk of 
the distribution for each type of security call lies at or above one, 
indicating that the majority of negative price reactions at announce- 
ment are short-lived. 
III. Earnings Forecast Revisions and Convertible Calls 
The evidence that for most firms the announcement effect is transitory 
casts doubt on information signaling as the principal explanation. This 
finding suggests the need for an analysis aimed directly at detection of 
a signaling effect. Any change in financial policy that conveys informa- 
tion about firm value should be of interest to financial analysts. There- 
fore, if a conversion-forcing call announcement conveys negative in- 
formation concerning the calling firm's future earnings, analysts should 
revise their earnings forecasts downward for that firm following the 
call announcement. 
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Following Ofer and Siegel (1987) and Israel, Ofer, and Siegel (1989), 
who develop and extend an innovative test for changes in analyst fore- 
casts, we measure the relative change in expected net operating in- 
come (NOI) as follows: 
L/NOIe NOI - NOIb (1) 
NoVe NOIb 
The numerator is the difference between the last Value Line forecast 
of net operating income before the call announcement (at time b) 
and the first forecast after the announcement (time a). We calculate 
NOPe following Israel, Ofer, and Siegel (1989) as the product of the 
operating margin and sales forecasts published by Value Line. The 
numerator of (1) is divided by the earnings forecast (NOIe) published 
at time b. 
Change in share price due to the call announcement is measured as 
follows: 
P_ Pt+,- _2 (2) 
In (2), Pt~1 is the closing price per share 1 day after the Wall Street 
Journal announcement date, and Pt_2 is the closing price immediately 
preceding the 2-day announcement period. 
The price change in (2) is the same as that used by Israel, Ofer, and 
Siegel (1989). We also perform the analysis employing a market- 
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adjusted measure, namely, the 3-day cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) from the market model, over the same time period (from t = 
-2tot = +1). 
We test the relationship between revisions in NOI forecasts subse- 
quent to call announcements and changes in share price by estimating 
the parameters of the model (3) below: 
ANOIe/NOIe = Do + AI APilPi + ei. (3) 
Equation (3) is also estimated with CARi substituted for AP1IP1. The 
analysis is done separately for changes in short-term (i.e., current 
year) and long-term forecasts (3-5 years ahead). 
If security calls portend bad news about firms' earnings, we expect 
the mean of ANOIe/NOIe to be negative, and we expect PIl in (3) to 
be positive for changes in long-term and short-term forecasts. In table 
2 we present average long- and short-term NOI forecasts before and 
after calls of convertible bonds and preferred stocks and measure 
changes in these forecasts three ways: change in dollar forecast, per- 
centage change in forecast, and the numbers of positive and negative 
revisions. The estimated mean change in NOI forecast is positive for 
long- and short-term forecasts following calls of convertible bonds and 
preferred stocks. The differences in means are statistically significant 
at the .05 level for changes in long-term forecasts following convertible 
bond calls (mean change = $17.79 million, t = 4.172), and for changes 
in short-term forecasts (mean = $5.99 million, t = 2.035). Average 
long-term forecast revisions pursuant to calls of convertible preferred 
stocks are also positive and significant at the .05 level (mean = $16.543 
million, t = 2.222). Average differences in short-term forecasts are 
also positive (mean = $5.33 million), but significant at only the .10 
level (t = 1.772). We conclude that the average earnings forecast is 
revised upward following convertible security calls, and the positive 
revision applies to both short-term and long-term forecasts of NOI. 
Mean percentage changes in earnings forecasts are also reported in 
table 2, and these may be more illuminating than the dollar changes. 
Short-term forecasts are revised upward an average of over 4% for 
both types of calls (4.23% for bonds and 4.60% for preferreds).6 
Average percentage changes in long-term forecasts are substantially 
larger for both types of security calls. The mean percentage revision 
for bond calls is 7.91%; the 95% confidence interval is (.0434, .1148). 
6. Normal theory confidence intervals (95%) are [.0130, .0715] for convertible bond 
calls and [- .0021, .0941] for convertible preferred calls. The data appear to be normal 
according to the Shapiro-Wilk (1965) statistic: .9515 for bonds and .9711 for preferreds. 
The statistic has an upper bound of 1.0. Efron's (1979) bootstrap estimates of the 95% 
confidence intervals for the median percentage changes are [.0044, .0535] and [.0000, 
.0602] for calls of convertible bonds and preferred stocks, respectively. 
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TABLE 2 Analysis of Changes in Value Line Forecasts of Short-Term and 
Long-Term Net Operating Income (NOI) Following Call 
Announcements for Convertible Bonds and Preferred Stocks 
Convertible Preferred 
Convertible Bond Calls Calls 
Short-Term Long-Term Short-Term Long-Term 
N 90 69 36 27 
Mean NOI forecast before 
call ($millions) 191.41 359.77 224.87 298.52 
Mean NOI forecast after call 
($millions) 197.40 377.56 230.20 315.07 
Mean change in NOI forecast 
($millions) (t-statistic)a 5.99 17.79 5.33 16.54 
(2.035)* (4.172)* (1.772)** (2.222)* 
Mean percentage change in 
NOI forecast (in %) 4.23 7.91 4.60 6.55 
Number of negative revisions 
in NOI forecast 26/90 9/69 12/36 5/27 
Number of negative revisions 
in sales forecasts 22/90 4/69 10/36 4/27 
Number of negative revisions 
in operating margin 
forecasts 23/90 12/69 7/36 5/27 
a The null hypothesis is that the change is less than zero. 
* Significant at the .05 level. 
** Significant at the .10 level. 
For preferred calls the mean is 6.55%; the 95% confidence interval is 
7 (.0030, . 1241).' 
The numbers of negative revisions in forecasts of NOI, sales, and 
operating margins are reported in the last three rows of table 2. The 
number of negative revisions in long-term NOI is very small for con- 
vertible bond calls (9/69) and convertible preferred calls (5/27). It is 
interesting to note that the NOI revisions are not driven exclusively 
by either sales or margin forecast changes, as indicated in the last two 
rows of table 2. In the majority of cases for both types of securities 
revisions of NOI, sales and operating margin are nonnegative. 
In figure 2, we give frequency histograms for percentage changes in 
NOIY (eq. [1]) for long- and short-term, for combined samples of both 
types of securities with normal densities superimposed. In panels 2a 
and 2b, we depict the histograms for convertible security calls, short- 
term (N = 126) and long-term (N = 96), respectively. For short-term 
NOI forecasts (panel 2a), only 38 of 126 (30%) are revised downward, 
while 88 (70%) are unchanged or revised upward. In panel 2b, long- 
7. The Shapiro-Wilk (1965) statistic is .8985 for bond calls and .9639 for preferred 
calls. Efron's (1979) bootstrap method with 1,000 iterations corroborates the finding for 
95% confidence intervals for median percentage changes: [.0440, .1180] for bond calls 
and [.0129, .1305] for preferred calls. 
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FIG. 2.-Frequency histograms of percentage changes in short-term and 
long-term net operating income (NOI) forecasts around calls of convertible 
bonds and preferred stocks. a, Revisions in short-term NOI forecasts for calls 
of convertible bonds and preferred stocks (N = 126); b, revisions in long-term 
NOI forecasts for calls of convertible bonds and preferred stocks (N = 96). 
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term forecasts, we see that only 17 of 96 are revised downward, while 
79 of 96 (82%) are revised upward or remain unchanged. 
These findings present a puzzle to those who argue that negative 
stock price reactions to convertible security calls are driven by an 
information mechanism involving operating income deterioration. All 
three of our measures indicate that analysts interpret convertible calls 
as positive information. We next test for a positive link between earn- 
ings forecast revisions and the price reaction to call announcements 
by estimating equation (3) by ordinary least squares.8 The results are 
reported in table 3. For convertible bond calls (panel A) there is evi- 
dence that short-term forecast revisions are positively related to equity 
value changes measured as APIP in equation (2) (t = 2.157). However, 
the evidence is substantially weaker when CARs are used to gauge the 
price reaction (t = 1.383). Changes in long-term forecasts, however, 
are not reliably related to price reactions (t = 1.337 for APIP, and 
t = .755 for CAR). 
For convertible preferred calls (panel B), none of the estimated slope 
coefficients (PIl) is significantly different from zero. This is true regard- 
less of whether APIP or CAR is used as the independent variable. We 
conclude that the data reveal no consistent and reliable relationship 
between Value Line forecast revisions and price reactions to call an- 
nouncements, inconsistent with an information effect. 
IV. Summary and Conclusions 
We find that for most calls of convertible bonds and convertible pre- 
ferred stocks in our sample, stock prices recover fully by the end of 
the conversion period. Thus, the widely documented negative an- 
nouncement effect is transitory for most firms, inconsistent with an 
explanation based on information signaling. 
Also, forecasts of net operating income produced by Value Line 
analysts are found to be revised upward, on average, following calls 
of convertible bonds and preferred stocks. The average positive re- 
vision is exhibited for both short-term and long-term forecasts. The 
findings are also counter to what would be expected according to a 
variety of information-based stories linking firms' profitability and call 
strategies. Our regression results indicate that a positive relation be- 
tween price effects and NOI forecast revisions is exhibited in only a 
subset of the data using ordinary least squares, and then only margin- 
ally so. 
But the market does react negatively to such call announcements. 
Mazzeo and Moore (1992) conclude that the average price reaction has 
8. White's (1980) test for heteroscedasticity indicates that ordinary least squares is 
appropriate. 
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TABLE 3 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of the Model 
ANOIe/NOIe = P3o + PBI APIP + E 
N e e 
A. Convertible bond calls: 
Short-term forecasts: 
AP/P 90 .0465 .7131 
(3.190) (2.157) 
CAR 90 .0498 .4481 
(3.183) (1.383) 
Long-term forecasts: 
AP/P 69 .0824 .6102 
(4.588) (1.337) 
CAR 69 .0843 .3319 
(4.388) (.755) 
B. Convertible preferred calls: 
Short-term forecasts: 
AP/P 36 .0474 .2299 
(1.947) (.340) 
CAR 36 .0489 .1899 
(1.938) (.370) 
Long-term forecasts: 
AP/P 27 .0613 .9433 
(1.980) (.876) 
CAR 27 .0699 .4650 
(2.225) (.676) 
NOTE.-Values in parentheses are t-statistics for respective coefficient estimates. APIP = per- 
centage change in closing price per share from day t = -2 to day t = + 1; CAR = cumulative 
abnormal return for 3-day announcement period, t = -2, + 1. 
a temporary component consistent with their market microstructure 
explanation. Our findings of no reliable linkage between earnings fore- 
casts and price reactions are consistent with an explanation such as 
that of Mazzeo and Moore (1992). While our findings may shed some 
light on the nature of call announcements, they also raise a prominent 
question. If earnings forecasts are elevated following calls, why does 
the market react negatively to the announcements? We speculate that 
the announcement effect may be due exclusively to a short-term phe- 
nomenon such as liquidity demand; that is, there may be no bad news 
associated with conversion-forcing calls. 
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